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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
ROSENN, Circuit Judge. 
 
This appeal challenges the unwritten policy of a state 
regulated Sewage Authority to subject its superintendent to 
urinalysis drug testing. Gregory Kerns, the plaintiff, sought 
employment in 1997 as the superintendent of a waste- 
water treatment facility operated and maintained by the 
Chalfont-New Britain Township Joint Sewage Authority 
("the Authority"). During his interview, the Authority 
informed Kerns that he would be required to undergo and 
pass a drug screening urinalysis as a condition of 
employment. He agreed and was permitted to make his own 
arrangements for the testing. He failed. He requested and 
the Authority granted another opportunity for testing and 
this time he passed. About 60 days later, the Authority 
asked Kerns to undergo another urinanalysis. He expressed 
no objection, provided a urine sample, and tested positive 
for marijuana. Kerns, still on probationary status, was 
discharged. 
 
Kerns filed an action in the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania under 42 U.S.C. 
S 1983, seeking reinstatement, declaratory judgment, and 
damages. He alleged that the Authority violated his Fourth 
Amendment right to be free from unreasonable searches 
when it required him to submit to and pass a drug test as 
a condition of employment. The District Court granted 
summary judgment in favor of the Authority, holding that 
Kerns' legitimate expectations of privacy were lessened by 
the "disastrous consequences" that can occur when 
mistakes are made in the operation of a sewage treatment 
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plant. The Court also held that Kerns had consented to the 
drug tests, thereby rendering them constitutionally 
permissible. Kerns timely appealed. We affirm. 
 
I. 
 
The Authority is a municipal agency authorized, 
organized and existing pursuant to the Pennsylvania 
Municipal Authorities Act of 1945, 53 P.S. S 3.91 et seq. In 
May 1997, Kerns applied to the Authority for the position of 
plant superintendent. The plant superintendent supervises 
approximately 15 employees and reports to the Executive 
Director, who in turn reports to the Authority's Board of 
Directors. 
 
Wastewater treatment plants in Pennsylvania are highly 
regulated and the Authority maintains that they can cause 
disaster to the local waterways and, consequently, to the 
health and safety of the local people and others 
downstream. We note that Pennsylvania has had a century- 
long interest in the cleanliness of its streams, waters and 
lakes. At the turn of the twentieth century, Pennsylvania 
embarked upon a program of preventing the pollution of its 
waters. See Act of 1905, P.L. 260, entitled"An Act to 
preserve the purity of the waters of the state for the 
protection of the public health." 
 
Consistent with this concern for unpolluted streams, 
Pennsylvania enacted further legislation from time to time. 
In 1937, the State enacted its Clear Streams Law which 
included prohibitions against industrial, as well as human 
waste. 1937 P.L. 1987, 35 P.S. S 691.1 et seq. It declared as 
state policy that 1) clean streams were "absolutely 
essential" if Pennsylvania were to attract new industries 
and tourists; 2) that clean unpolluted waters was 
absolutely essential for the State's out of door recreational 
facilities in the decades ahead; 3) that the objective of the 
Act was not only to prevent further pollution of the waters 
of the Commonwealth but to reclaim every stream that is 
polluted to a clean and unpolluted condition; and 4) that 
achievement of the Act's objectives required "a 
comprehensive program of watershed management and 
control." 35 P.S. S 691.4. The Clean Stream Law is a 
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regulatory statute and, as subsequently amended, bars any 
person or municipality from discharging or permitting the 
discharge, directly or indirectly, into waters of the 
Commonwealth any sewage except as provided by the Act. 
Failure of a municipality to comply may result in the facility 
being declared a nuisance subject to severe civil penalties, 
and its officials subject to contempt. 
 
In 1965, the state enacted the Pennsylvania Sewage 
Facilities Act. As amended in 1974, the Act empowered the 
Department of Environmental Resources, inter alia, to 
adopt standards for maintenance of community sewage 
disposal systems. See 35 P.S. S 750.3, historical and 
statutory notes. The Department also has the power to 
review the performance of local agencies in the 
administration of the Act, to order a local agency to 
undertake actions deemed necessary by the Department"to 
effectively administer this Act, to inspect regular reports, 
books and records of local agencies, to revoke or suspend 
the certification of sewage enforcement officers for cause, 
and to require at the Department's discretion a certified 
sewage enforcement officer whose performance has been 
evaluated." 35 P.S. S 750.10. 
 
With the State's strict laws pertaining to the operation of 
sewage treatment plants hovering over it, the Board, at the 
recommendation of its Personnel Committee, established an 
unwritten policy and practice that all new hires must 
submit to and pass a drug screening urinalysis as a 
condition of employment.1 When Kerns interviewed for the 
position of plant superintendent, he was informed that he 
would have to pass a drug test to obtain the job. Kerns 
agreed to submit to such a test. 
 
A medical examiner performed the urinalysis on Kerns 
approximately two weeks after he began his employment. 
Kerns tested positive for marijuana use. When he found out 
about the positive test result, Kerns insisted that it was 
inaccurate and denied having used marijuana. After 
importuning by Kerns, the Authority's Board of Directors 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. This policy is separate from the Authority's written policy mandating 
pre-employment and random drug testing for employees holding 
Commercial Drivers' Licenses. 
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agreed to permit him to submit to another drug test rather 
than terminate him. 
 
On June 27, 1997, Kerns reported to another medical 
examiner for his second drug test. This time, the results 
were negative and the Authority allowed Kerns to continue 
his probationary employment.2 At that point, Kerns claims, 
he believed that he had successfully completed his pre- 
employment drug testing and that he would not be 
subjected to further tests. (App. at 217-218). On the other 
hand, John Schmidt, the Executive Director, claims that he 
told David Cordell, the chairman of the Authority's 
personnel committee, to inform Kerns that he would have 
to undergo a random drug test some time in the future. 
(App. at 383-384). Cordell never mentioned this to Kerns. 
(App. at 473). 
 
On September 2, 1997, Schmidt instructed Kerns to 
report for another drug test. (74A). Kerns was surprised, 
but did not object. Several days later, Kerns received a 
phone call from the laboratory that his urine sample had 
tested positive for marijuana. Kerns then informed Schmidt 
of the positive result. Later that day, at a meeting between 
Schmidt, Kerns and Cordell, Kerns pleaded for his job.3 
Kerns was told to go home and await further instructions. 
Later that day he received a phone call telling him not to 
come to work for a few days. On September 15, 1997, the 
Authority discharged Kerns because of his positive test 
result. Kerns then commenced this action under 42 U.S.C. 
S 1983. 
 
On appeal, Kerns's primary contention is that the drug 
testing severely impinged upon his legitimate privacy 
expectations, and that in the absence of a compelling need 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. The Sewage Authority places all new hires on probation for the first 
six months of their employment, after which they are considered 
permanent employees. 
 
3. Kerns claims that he did not admit to smoking marijuana, but 
admitted that he had recently been exposed to second-hand smoke at a 
party where others were smoking marijuana. (App. at 235). Schmidt 
claims that Kerns admitted that he himself had smoked marijuana at 
that party. (App. at 392). 
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for the Authority's drug policy, the policy is constitutionally 
impermissible. 
 
II. 
 
It is settled law that the collection and analysis of a urine 
sample to test for drug use constitutes a search that is 
subject to the constraints of the Constitution's Fourth 
Amendment. See Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' 
Association, 489 U.S. 602, 617 (1989). However, it is also 
settled law that a search conducted with the free and 
voluntary consent of the person searched is constitutional. 
See Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 219 (1972). 
In its alternative ground for granting summary judgment 
for the defendants, the District Court held, without much 
discussion, that Kerns consented to drug testing. (Op. at 4). 
We begin our analysis with this ground because if there 
was a valid basis for it, we need not evaluate the 
constitutionality of the Authority's drug testing policy. 
 
Whether a person consented to a search is a question of 
fact to be determined from the totality of the circumstances. 
See Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 226. We review for clear error 
the District Court's factual finding that Kerns consented to 
the tests. When Kerns first interviewed for his position at 
the Authority, he was informed that he would have to take 
a drug test as a condition of employment. In response, 
Kerns replied, "I'm just fine. I have no problem." This 
statement is nearly identical to the language held to convey 
consent in Schneckloth, where a motorist said "sure, go 
ahead" when the police asked if they could search his car. 
See id. at 220. 
 
On May 28, 1997, the Sewage Authority extended a 
conditional offer of employment to Kerns. This offer was 
made by way of a letter from John Schmidt which stated 
"this offer is contingent upon successful completion of the 
pre-employment physical and drug test as we discussed." 
(A. 519). Kerns signed this letter, indicating that he 
accepted the offer and the terms contained therein. 
 
The first urinalysis took place approximately two weeks 
after Kerns began his employment. Kerns voiced no 
objection to the test and, in fact, made all the arrangements 
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for the test himself. Unfortunately, the test results were 
positive. Kerns insisted that the test was inaccurate and 
asked the Authority for permission to take a retest. 
Although the Authority would have been within its 
contractual rights to terminate Kerns at that point, it 
agreed to allow him to submit to another test. On June 27, 
1999, Kerns reported to a different medical examiner for his 
second drug test. This time Kerns passed, and was allowed 
to continue his probationary employment. 
 
The circumstances surrounding the first two tests 
demonstrate Kerns' voluntary consent. Kerns was told 
during the interview that he would be required to pass a 
drug test as a condition of employment. He stated that he 
had "no problem" with taking such a test and signed a 
contract acknowledging that his offer of employment was 
contingent on it. He then submitted to the test without 
objection. The second test was administered at Kerns' own 
request. Under these circumstances, we agree with the 
District Court that Kerns' consent to the searches was 
clear. 
 
Consent to the third and final test is less clear. 
Approximately two months after Kerns passed his second 
drug test, he was approached by John Schmidt, the 
executive director, who instructed him to produce another 
urine sample for analysis. Kerns, who believed that his 
drug testing obligations had been completed, was 
surprised, but submitted to the test without objection. It is 
the law of this circuit that "silent submission" to a drug test 
"on pain of dismissal from employment" does not constitute 
consent. Bolden v. SEPTA, 953 F.2d 807, 824 (3d Cir. 
1991). However, Kerns did more than silently submit. He 
had signed a document in which he agreed to 
"successful[ly] complet[e]" a pre-employment drug test as a 
condition of his employment. The conflicting results of 
Kerns' first two tests were inconclusive. Therefore, it was 
reasonable for the Authority to view Kerns' drug testing 
obligation as incomplete and to require that he successfully 
complete that obligation as he had contracted to do. 
Accordingly, we see no error, much less clear error, in the 
District Court's alternative conclusion that Kerns consented 
to all three drug tests. 
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The judgment of the District Court will be affirmed. Each 
side to bear its own costs. 
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